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I. INTRODUCTION
CAPITATING PROVIDERS IS THE LATEST frontrunner
for the title of best new cost-effectiveness technique for im-
proving U.S. health service delivery. Capitation's incentive struc-
ture, allowing providers to keep any savings generated by deliv-
ering health care more efficiently, prods physicians to focus on
cost-effectiveness when recommending treatment.1 That focus is
critically important because doctors effectively dictate patient
treatment regimes, notwithstanding the rhetoric of informed con-
sent.2 In theory, capitation stimulates physicians to secure better
care for their patients at lower aggregate cost, because the finan-
cial prosperity of providers increases in direct proportion to their
success in keeping patients well.3
Health insurers and PHOs 4 have been busily extolling capi-
tation to doctors not only as a way of prospering financially, but
also as a means for recapturing the clinical autonomy they lost
under managed care. Physicians enmeshed in prisoners' dilem-
mas of micro-management under current managed care systems5
are attracted by capitation's potential for restoring their status as
masters of the treatment universe. Since capitation gives them
control over budgets for much-if not virtually all-of patient
care, physicians can prescribe the therapeutic regimes they be-
1. See generally DAVID 1. SAMUELS. CAPITATION: NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN HEALTHCARE
Dm.lvmy (1996); Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-
Care Plans Make With Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678 (1995); James C. Robinson &
Lawrence P. Casalino, The Growth of Medical Groups Paid Through Capitation in California,
333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1684 (1995); Symposium: Capitation, 22 Am. J.L. & MED. 167 (1996).
2. See George J. Annas & Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and
Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, 20 Am. J. L & MED.
357 (1994).
3. See generally Mary A. Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from
Their Physicians, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291, 301-08 (1994) (discussing the theories underlying
the relationship between economic incentives and the behavior of physicians); Vemellia R.
Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Pa-
tients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1, 22-41
(1993) (discussing utilization review, financial risk-shifting, and effects of cost containment
on quality of care).
4. A PHO, or physician-hospital organization, "is a generic term used to describe any
type of joint venture entity among hospitals and physicians ... formed for the purpose of
collective hospital/physician activities in the managed care contracting arena." Carl H.
Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational Models, 29 WAKE
FoREST L. REV. 273, 296 n.95 (1994).
5. See Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Impli-
cations of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 708
(1986); Hitchner et al., supra note 4.
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lieve most cost-effectively treat their patients' maladies (and si-
multaneously enhance their own bottom lines by retaining any
surplus), unfettered by insurer cost containment restrictions.
Moreover, capitated systems supply the risk-sharing needed to
insulate nonintegrated physicians from antitrust liability when
they employ joint pricing strategies in contracting with powerful
insurers. 6
Provider capitation is marketed as a win-win strategy for
coping with both cost and quality problems perennially bedevil-
ing the world's health care systems. It gives physicians incen-
tives to shop carefully when they exercise their economic power
to order clinical treatment for patients. Only the size of their
capitated budgets theoretically constrains the range of clinical
choice. In addition, payors escape the headache of trying to
micro-manage physician decisions, 7 because risk (and potential
reward) has been shifted from insurer to provider. Insurers are
protected further from a doctor's temptation to breach the con-
tract between them by under-providing services,8 because the
doctor does not want to create an angry patient by delivering
poor quality care any more than the insurer wants to lose that
unhappy patient as a subscriber. Finally, patients-off the hook
for purchasing each unit of medical service they consume-can
relax any fears they may have about insurance bureaucrats un-
dermining their doctors' clinical judgment by second-guessing
treatment recommendations in the interest of cost containment.
Is this glowing scenario too good to be true? Might there
not be a dilemma or two lurking in capitation's implementation?
As in most situations, that depends-most specifically on the
way capitation incentives are structured and regulated. 9 Too gen-
6. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982) (holding that
joint pricing by unintegrated physicians not sharing substantial risk is per se illegal price fix-
ing). Cf. FTC Staff Advisory Opinion Denying Antitrust Clearance of Nevada Orthopaedic
IPA, reprinted in 4 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1128 (1995) [hereinafter FTC Staff Advisory
Opinion] (denying IPA antitrust clearance for capitated orthopedic services because it is pro-
hibited by Nevada law.)
7. This process is referred to on both sides of the Atlantic as akin to "trying to herd
cats." Milt Freudenheim, Physicians Are Selling Practices to Companies as Changes Loom,
N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 1, 1993, at Al. See also Simon Kuper, Unhealthy Tension For Hospital
Staff. Health Reforms, THE LONDON FiN. Timms, May 16, 1995, at 10.
8. The insurer is the pivotal party to two related contracts here; it has contracted with
the subscriber to pay for a defined range of medical services in return for the premium and
with the provider to furnish those services in return for a set level of payment.
9. Cf. Carol Propper, Regulatory Reform of the NHS Internal Market, 4 HEALTH EcON.
77 (1995) (discussing the incentives and disincentives of National Health Service regulatory
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erous a level of capitation payments will undercut the stimulus
for efficiency, while too parsimonious a capitated amount forces
providers to stint quality in order to retain income.
Setting the capitated payment at the optimal level required
to balance societal cost and quality objectives is a feat worthy of
Houdini's best efforts. 10 Since perfecting that trick on a moving
target like health care seems well-nigh hopeless, the theory of
the second best dictates that some degree of monitoring over
clinical decision making probably is inevitable. The question is,
who should exercise it? Employers and employer groups have re-
cently displayed more purchasing muscle" and this, combined
with rapidly improving information technology in the health care
field, may make market forces a more effective regulator of both
cost and quality than they have been in the past. Can insurers or
providers themselves be entrusted to monitor quality in response
to market-consumer pressures, or should the government inter-
vene?12 Undoubtedly some combination of market and regulatory
forces will be most effective, but where should the balance be
struck? Can an incentive system for delivering cost-effective care
of reasonable quality be devised that still will preserve sufficient
physician autonomy to satisfy doctors' sense of professionalism?
II. FORMS OF U.S. PROVIDER CAPITATION
Experiments with various forms of capitation are now being
undertaken by all types of U.S. health insurers. 3 Closed staff
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) like the Kaiser
Permanente plans are among the most well-known instances of
reform); David M. Frankford, Managing Medical Clinicians' Work Through the Use of Finan-
cial Incentives, 29 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 71 (1994) (asserting that financial incentives in
clinical practice will increase conflict, not control).
10. Cf. Glenn Lohrmann, Capitation: Implications for Provider Cost Structures,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1995, at 36 (arguing that operating managers should be held
accountable for the full costs of their products); Arnold M. Epstein & Edward J. Cumella,
Capitation Payment: Using Predictors of Medical Utilization to Adjust Rates, HEM.TH CARE
FIN. REV., Fall 1988, at 51 (summarizing studies of predictors of medical utilization among
the elderly).
11. Frances H. Miller, Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances: Monopsony Threat or
Procompetitive Rxfor Health Sector Ills?, 79 CoRta. L REV. 1546 (1994).
12. Cf. WARREN GREENBERG, COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND RATIONING IN HEALTH
CARE 97-109 (1991) (arguing that competition may improve resource allocation).
13. See generally DAVID LEE, CAPITATION: THE PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE (1995) (available
from the American Med. Ass'n, Chicago). Cf. Louise Kertesz & Joanne Wojcik, Risky PHOs
Winning Bet, 25 MODERN HEALTHCARE 44 (July 25, 1994).
[Vol. 6:89
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global capitation for patient care, but Kaiser historically has inte-
grated both insurer and provider functions within the same entity.
The capitated amount takes the form of a single comprehensive
insurance premium payable to Kaiser. The newer wrinkle is for
insurers to use premium income to capitate unintegrated provid-
ers secondarily, but directly. In that way risk is shifted down to
the smaller independent provider units that actually deliver medi-
cal care. One version of the evolution in capitated systems is de-



















The federal and various state governments have been experi-
menting with capitating Medicare14 and Medicaid 5 services for
some time, originally through traditional HMOs. The Medicare
diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system, in effect for
more than a decade, is another method of directly capitating
providers. Under the DRG system, the government pays hospitals
a lump sum, specified in advance, on the basis of each Medicare
patient's discharge diagnosis, rather than reimbursing for that pa-
tient's actual health care costs. DRG financial incentives have
been a significant contributor to the declining length of hospital
stays in the United States because a discharged patient ceases to
be costly to the hospital, but little evidence of any accompanying
decline in clinical quality stemming from DRG use has been
documented.
Governments now are toying more adventurously with per-
mitting capitated Medicare and Medicaid insurers to re-capitate
their contracting providers secondarily. Private insurers of all
stripes also are playing around with provider capitation concepts,
top-slicing administrative fees and profits, and then shifting sig-
nificant risk to doctors, hospitals, and integrated provider net-
works.1 6 Recent controversies over compensation for officers of
some managed care insurers, however, have focused damaging
attention on the possibilities for corporate exploitation in this
area.17 They also have sharpened the long-simmering debate over
whether rationing is inherent in managed care, particularly where
closed-end financing like direct provider capitation is involved. If
provider capitation fees are squeezed too tightly, the quality of
patient care inevitably will appear on the casualty list.
Provider capitation concepts can take a wide variety of
forms contractually, but local law limits the range of possible ar-
rangements in some states.18 At the simplest level, physicians can
14. Approximately 250 HMOs now participate in Medicare. Sharon McIlrath, HCFA
Estimates 10% Rate Hikes for Medicare HMOs, AKt. MiD. NEws, Aug. 14, 1995, at 7. See,
e.g., Partial Capitation Holds Promise for Expansion of Medicare Managed Care, Health
Care Pol'y Rep., (BNA) 14d22 (Apr. 3, 1995).
15. See, e.g., John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Medicaid and Managed Care,
332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1727 (1995); Georgia Allows Managed Care Plans to Provide Ser-
vices for Capitated Fee, Health Care Pol'y Rep., (BNA) 30d36 (July 24, 1995).
16. See Kertesz & Wojcik, supra note 13.
17. Milt Freudenheim, Penny-Pinching H.M.O.s Showed Their Generosity in Executive
Paychecks, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 11, 1995, at DI (illustrating that for-profit HMOs are "re-
warding their chief executives with sizable pay packages.").
18. See, e.g., Kurt Fernandez, Industry Says Texas Lawmakers Adopt Conflicting Laws
[Vol. 6:89
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be capitated solely for delivering their own services. In such sit-
uations, they usually contract with insurers to provide whatever
care (within their medical competence) patients require during a
given period of time, in return for a set total fee. A more com-
plex arrangement would capitate a primary care doctor for all
physician services needed by a particular patient, whether pro-
vided personally or by other professionals. In that case, the pri-
mary care physician would channel those patients needing more
sophisticated care to the appropriate specialist, and then pay the
specialist's fees from a larger initially capitated amount.
Primary care or other physicians also can be capitated for
any and all other medical services their patients may need, in-
cluding hospitalization, drugs, nursing home care, free-standing
clinic services, home care, and/or anything else that conceivably
could be categorized under the label of health. Alternatively, any
insurer can capitate any and/or all of the secondary players listed
above directly for their own services or products. Some commen-
tators contend that such direct specialist capitation may be neces-
sary in order to align the financial incentives properly. 9 Finally,
any of these players can receive a prescribed annual fee in com-
bination with any of the other providers, in return for delivering
a contractually defined smorgasbord of health care to insureds.
This Article focuses exclusively on those arrangements sharing
one salient characteristic: a shift of some degree of underwriting
risk from insurer to provider.20
I. RISK-SHIFTING IN THE UNITED STATES
Risk-shifting can be tricky business, particularly with re-
spect to capitating physicians. Individual doctors generally lack
the actuarial skills critical to assessing what their true exposure
to financial risk and benefit may be at given levels of payment.
They may be relatively safe, however, when it comes to agreeing
on a capitated rate covering only their own professional services,
on Global Capitation, 3 IDALTH L REP. (BNA) 1306 (Aug. 14, 1995); FTC Staff Advisory
Opinion, supra note 6.
19. Cf. Paul R. DeMuro, Paying Specialists and Subspecialists on a Capitated Basis,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1995, at 33 (discussing the need for and difficulty in institut-
ing specialty capitation).
20. Any of these arrangements can incorporate a separate insurance component also,
but this Article focuses only on direct provider capitation rather than on providers who are
vertically integrated with insurers.
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for they ordinarily have a pretty good idea about the care likely
to be needed by their usual patient base. Even an unexpected
liver transplant candidate 21-- or a surge of costly HIV or AIDS
patients22 -need not prove financially disastrous, for these doc-
tors are only required to supply their own knowledge, skill, and
judgment to patients for the agreed capitated sum. They may
have to work harder than expected if unanticipated catastrophic
illness strikes their enrolled populations, but they will not be fi-
nancially responsible for the other (presumably expensive) ther-
apy any unforeseen transplant candidate or HIV or other costly
patients might require.
Once capitation payments for a larger share of patient medi-
cal needs becomes involved, however, individual physicians enter
more dangerous fiscal territory; physicians rarely have accurate
information about the total costs of patient care. In such situa-
tions, monetary obligations for those same unanticipated HIV,
AIDS, or liver transplant patients could prove financially ruinous
to them. Primary care doctors conceivably might take on the fi-
nancial burden of paying for whatever specialist care such loss-
generating patients might need, but shouldering sole pecuniary
responsibility for the additional costs of facility-based care would
be downright foolhardy.23 Thus, insurers usually place global
capitation contracts only with physician, hospital, or combined
physician-hospital groups; by informed U.S. estimates a 1000-pa-
tient base is required for minimal actuarial stability when pri-
mary care doctors are capitated directly for total patient care.24 It
would be highly unlikely to find an individual physician taking
care of 1000 patients covered under capitation contracts with the
21. The average cost of a liver transplant in mid-1995 was $153,000. Stephen Baker,
Caught in the Organ Grind, Bus. WK., Aug. 21, 1995, at 32.
22. The lifetime costs of treating HIV patients range from $60,000 to more than
$100,000. Fred J. Hellinger, The Lifetime Cost of Treating a Person with HIV, 270 JAMA
474, 477-78 (1993).
23. A capitated physician provider group may or may not be considered an insurer for
purposes of state insurance regulation, including reserve requirements. See Jordan v. Group
Health Ass'n, 107 F. 2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (holding that insurance statutes do not necessa-
rily regulate all arrangements for assumption or distribution of risk). This is a matter of some
concern to state governments, see Overwhelming Opinion of NAIC Group That Provider Net-
works Be Licensed, 4 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1264 (Aug. 17, 1995); Jeannine Mjoseth, NAIC
Bulletin to Address Application of Insurance Laws to Provider Groups, 4 Health L. Rep.
(BNA) 1177 (Aug. 3, 1995).
24. Interview with Joseph Gerstein, HMO Medical Director of Tufts Associated Health
Plans, in Waltham, Mass (June 6, 1995).
[Vol. 6:89
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same insurer now, let alone caring for even more of them. 2
When specialists are capitated directly for the full costs of secon-
dary and tertiary care in their own specialty areas, much larger
numbers of covered lives ordinarily must be involved for the
costing predictions to have any meaning.26 At present the marked
shift of physicians from solo into group practice models of or-
ganization accelerates, and thus facilitates, the capitation trend.
IV. PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY ISSUES INHERENT IN
CAPITATION
Although capitation theoretically "empowers" physicians by
giving them control over budgets for varying amounts of patient
care, at least three autonomy issues always are involved when
physicians are capitated directly. In taking on more risk-reward
potential through capitation, doctors may nevertheless find their
professional autonomy circumscribed concerning their own
clinical skills and with regard to their ability to make referrals.
Their economic latitude to secure other health care services that
they believe could benefit their patients, but which they do not
provide themselves, could also be compromised if the capitated
sum is calculated too closely to the line for reasonable accom-
modation to patient medical needs.
A. Professional Clinical Autonomy
Although capitated payments theoretically free physicians
from insurer cost-containment encroachments on their clinical au-
tonomy, insurers still keep a watchful eye on the clinical quality
of the care their contracted providers deliver. After all, if quality
standards for insured patients fall, the affected subscribers even-
tually will defect to other insurers. Thus, insurers develop vary-
ing methods of quality oversight. Some rely on random retro-
spective review, while others require providers to submit dummy
bills for each patient encounter, charting them exactly as they
would were they submitting bills for fee-for-service reimburse-
ment. The only difference is that those doctors already have been
paid a lump sum in advance for delivering the care.
25. However, if current insurance industry consolidation continues apace patients will
have fewer choices among insurers, so that possibility might not seem so far-fetched in the
long run.
26. DeMuro, supra note 19.
Winterl196]
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These oversight methods can be more or less onerous, de-
pending on the plan, so that doctors may or may not find that
capitation at least lets them escape the curse of insurer red tape.
The real threat from insurer quality oversight, however, is to the
doctor's continuing contractual relationship with the capitating
insurer, which is an increasingly significant source of physician
income. Capitation contracts usually are written on an annual ba-
sis, and a physician ordinarily is vulnerable to nonrenewal for no
cause, let alone for problems associated with quality. In any
event, capitation's seductive promise of clinical autonomy for
physicians may well prove slippery, if not rather hollow. Doctors
may be free from second opinion requirements and pre-admission
review, but they could well end up wishing they had those de-
vices to validate their medical judgment and thus protect their
contractual relations with the insurer.
B. Referral Autonomy
For those physicians controlling budgets covering care other
than what they deliver themselves, capitation theoretically per-
mits them to order whatever additional services they believe will
help their patients. The potential fly in the ointment, however,
may be that the provider pool to which they are permitted to re-
fer for other services may be severely circumscribed. In other
words, in the interest of the most cost-effective care, the insurer
may have limited the doctors' clinical freedom contractually in
another indirect manner. (Those capitated for just their own ser-
vices also often find that their insurer only permits referrals to
certain preferred providers.) In some situations, referrals are lim-
ited to certain forms of treatment, or no referrals at all will be
permitted for patients with certain diagnoses.27 Doctors in these
circumstances must refrain from giving full rein to their treat-
ment preferences unless the patient is prepared to pay for them
out-of-pocket. When physician referral autonomy is thus sharply
constrained, the referring doctor's clinical autonomy undeniably
is circumscribed. It is as simple as that. Physicians should, there-
fore, analyze with extreme care whatever contract restrictions
may be imposed on their referral powers.
27. Typical limitations might relate to infertility and certain forms of terminal illness.
[Vol. 6:89
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C. Economic Autonomy
The third major area of concern with regard to physician
autonomy under capitation concerns the doctor's economic free-
dom to secure more sophisticated or ancillary patient care. Char-
acterizing capitation as a breakthrough enhancement to physician
autonomy is highly misleading if the capitated budget allocated
to doctors will not stretch to cover the full range of other medi-
cal services they believe their patients need. The whole point of
provider capitation is to shift decision making-and financial re-
sponsibility-"down to the coal-face" where providers quite lit-
erally must confront patient medical problems in flesh and blood.
However, inadequate capitation payments can make a mockery
of purported clinical autonomy. Thus, the actuarial skills of in-
surers are critical to reasonable capitation, as are the analytical
skills of physicians in deciphering what the capitated amount
translates into in terms of patient care. Some sort of stop-loss
coverage for treatment outliers undeniably should be built into
any reasonable capitated payment system.
V. CAPITATION UNDER BRITAIN'S NATIONAL HEALTH
SERVICE
Although most U.S. physicians at least are hazily familiar
with capitation concepts, the idea of provider capitation is rela-
tively new and vaguely threatening to many of them because of
the administrative burden and financial uncertainties associated
with risk-shifting. The methodology itself has been around for
decades, however. The British have been capitating general prac-
titioners (GPs) for their own professional services since 1948
when the National Health Service (NHS) first came into exis-
tence. This system has worked remarkably well. 28 Great Britain
spends about seven percent of its gross domestic product to
cover the health needs of its entire population, while we spend
more than twice as much, still leaving out at least fifteen percent
of our citizenry.29 For all that impressive expenditure, the public
28. See generally DAVID TAYLOR & KAREN BL OR. HEALTH CAE, HEALTH PROMOTION
AND THE Furnnt oF GENA.L PRAcncE (1994).
29. Joyce Price, How Health Plans Work in Other Countries, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1994, at E4 (citing U.K. NHS statistics). See also Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health
Expenditures, 1993, H.ALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1994, at 247 (placing share of GDP de-
voted to health care at 13.9% in 1993); Growth In Health Spending Projected To Reach 36
.Percent In Next Five Years, Health Care Daily, (BNA) d8 (June 14, 1995) (projecting share
)V'mter 1996]
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health basic indices in the United States are no better than those
in Britain, and in many cases, such as infant mortality, generally
are worse.
30
From the beginnings of the NHS, British GPs have been
paid a set amount each year for delivering primary care to each
patient registered on their rolls.31 The current annual capitation
amount of £14.80 per patient under the age of sixty-five (about
$22.00 at current rates of exchange) indeed seems modest in
comparison with American standards; it probably amounts to less
than the charge for a single office visit in most parts of this
country.32 However, when combined with other NHS fees GPs
can earn, 33 and income from the private practice that all British
physicians are permitted to do,34 it has been sufficient to keep
British doctors well-ensconced in the highest income brackets in
their country over the past half-century.35
of GDP devoted to health care will rise to 16% by the year 2000).
30. Five years ago the United States spent 200% more per capita on health care than
did the United Kingdom. Leslie M. Greenwald, Meaning in Numbers, HEALTH MGmT Q.,
Third Quarter 1992, at 6, 7, tbl. 1.
31. British GPs also can receive incentive bonuses for achieving public health objec-
tives, such as reaching targeted percentages of their patient populations with cervical screen-
ing and immunizations. See generally HOWARD GLENNERSTER ET AL., IMPLEMENTING GP
FUNDHOLDING 13-19 (1994).
32. The amount rises to £19.55 for patients between 65 and 74 and to £37.80 for those
over age 80. DEPARTMENT OF HATH, GREAT BRITAIN NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE GENERAL
MEDICAL SERVICES: STATEMENT OF FEEs AND ALLOWANCES PAYABLE TO GENERAL MEDICAL
PRACTImONERS m ENGLAND AND WALES (1994).
33. For example, GPs earn from £16.15 to £48.45 for each night visit they make and
from £715 to £2145 for reaching targeted percentages of their pediatric patients with immuni-
zations. GPs also are paid on a fee-for-service basis for performing certain minor surgical
procedures. Id.
34. GPs generally do not realize significant income from seeing patients in private
practice, but consultants in private practice averaged £40,000 above their NHS income in the
early 1990s. KAREN BLooR., How MUCH IS A DOCTOR WORTH?, University of York Discussion
Paper 98 (1992). See also JOHN YATES. PRIVATE EYE, HEART AND Hip: SURGIC.AL CONSUL.
TANTS, THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND PRIVATE MEDICINE (1995) (attacking the dual sta-
tus of NHS consultants engaging in private practice to the detriment of their NHS responsi-
bilities); MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, HMSO PRIVATE MEDICAL SERVICES: A
REPORT ON AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES RELATING TO CHARGES FOR THE SUPPLY OF PRIVATE
MEDICAL SERVICES BY NHS CONSULTANTS, 2452 (1994).
35. Consultants (specialists) are salaried physicians employed directly by hospitals.
Their earnings, supplemented by private practice income and distinction award payments,
generally have been higher than those of GPs. KAREN BLooR & ALAN MAYNARD, REWARDING
EXCELLENCE? CONSULTANTS' DISTINCTION AWARDS AND THE NEED FOR REFORM, Discussion
Paper 100, 1 (1992).
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A. Purchaser-Provider Separation
In 1991, the NHS was re-structured to introduce competition
principles under the umbrella of socialized medicine. 6 The inter-
nal markets initiated when the reforms were implemented essen-
tially divorced the British government's health service purchasing
function from its traditional provider role, and relatively abruptly
compelled hospitals and other NHS facilities to compete for con-
tracts to deliver patient care. Local hospitals, routinely accus-
tomed to receiving annual budgets (on the basis of past work-
load) from the Department of Health for providing care to area
residents, now are required to vie for cash-limited funding from
newly designated purchasers for the government instead. 37 Insti-
tutions have to compete to serve patients who used to be chan-
neled to them as a matter of course by local GPs. They must
compete for patient referrals not only with rival institutional
providers from neighboring districts, the private sector, and from
abroad, but also with newly innovative outpatient providers of
services formerly found only in association with an inpatient
setting.
In 1991, the government began capitating GP-fundholder
groups, 38 permitting them to purchase (from an enlarged capitated
sum) a broader range of their patients' consultant (specialist),
hospital, pharmaceutical, and other health needs. These GPs get
separate budgets for their patients' drug needs, and for their non-
urgent specialist and inpatient care,39 in addition to the basic cap-
itation payment covering their own services. Fundholders also
have their administrative budgets augmented to cover the in-
36. For a general description of the reforms, see Patricia Day & Rudolf Klein, Britain's
Health Care Experiment, HEALTH AF., Fall 1991, at 3, 39; Frances Miller, Competition Law
and Anticompetitive Professional Behaviour Affecting Health Care, 55 MoO. L. REv. 453
(1992) [hereinafter Competition Law]. For an analysis concluding that the 1991 reforms are
basically incompatible with "the ideals of a public, free and comprehensive health service,"
see JoHN MoHAN, A NATIONAL HEAILTH SERvica? THE RESTRUCrRNG OF HEALTH CARE IN
BRITAIN SINCE 1979, 233 (1995).
37. For a description of these new purchasers and their functions, see infra nn. 40-46
and accompanying text.
38. The government originally required these groups to have a minimum of 11,000 pa-
tients on their rolls, but that number was later reduced to 9000, then 7000 and most recently
to 5000. See GtENNEasm ET AL.. IMPLEMENTING GP FUNDHOLDING, supra note 31, at 9-10.
39. Jennifer Dixon, Can There Be Fair Funding For Fundholding Practices? Funding
of Large Practices Under Britain's National Health Service, 308 BMJ 772 (1994). Some
fundholders recently have complained that budgets no longer are keeping up with rising costs.
See also HEALTH SExv. J., Mar. 23, 1995, at 4.
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creased expense of taking on the purchasing function. 40 GPs
practicing alone were excluded from fundholder status at the
start, because their typical patient base is considered too small
for effective risk-spreading, but they now can participate through
cooperatives. 41 Very small practices cannot support the adminis-
trative and information infrastructures deemed essential to effi-
cient purchasing.42
This year more than half of all NHS patients are registered
in fundholder practices, 43 and the Conservative government has
strongly urged more GPs to become involved in fundholding. It
has encouraged them to form groups and purchasing consortia
with other fundholders if necessary to achieve minimum
fundholding size. In addition, the District Health Authorities
(DHAs), which purchase specialist and hospital services for non-
fundholding GPs, have involved primary care doctors much more
closely in their purchasing decisions. 4 After early opposition to
internal markets, the British Medical Association has come
around to supporting GP purchasing as "the key to ensuring
change and efficiency in the NHS," reflecting the enthusiastic
embrace of the purchaser role by a growing number of GPs.45
Most recently, a pilot project in total practice budget
fundholding has provided selected fundholder practices with fi-
nancial control over virtually the full range of whatever govern-
ment-funded health services their patients may need, including
emergency care, but it is too early yet for analysis of the ef-
40. For basic structure of the 1991 reforms, see Miller, Competition Law, supra note
36, at 455-63.
41. More than half of British patients now are enrolled with fundholding GPs. David
Fletcher, Fundholder GPs Treat More Than Half of Patients, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr.
2, 1996, at 16.
42. B. J. Crump et a]., Fundholding in General Practice and Financial Risk, 302 BMJ
1582 (1991). Informed commentators suggest that at a 7000-patient fundholding minimum,
"small risk pools will become a serious problem in the future." Manos Matsaganis & How-
ard Glennerster, The Threat of "Cream Skimming" in the Post-Reform NHS, 13 J. HEL.,TH
ECON. 31, 56 (1994). The small-pool problem presumably has been exacerbated by the reduc-
tion in minimum practice numbers for fundholding to 5000.
43. David Fletcher, More GPs Take Over Budget, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 30, 1995, at
6.
44. Perspectives on Purchasing: Think Globally Act Locally, HEALTH SERv. J., Jan. 13,
1994 at 27, 28. The Labour Party has said that, when elected to a Parliamentary majority, it
will abolish fundholding but will keep the purchaser-provider split. Dolly Chadda, Managers
Breathe Again as Labour Reveals Plans, HEALTH SERv. J., June 22, 1995, at 6.
45. Patrick Butler, Give GPs Buying Power, Says BMA, HEALTH SERV. J., Apr. 20,
1995, at 4 (citing HEALTH POL'Y AND ECON. RESEARCH UNIT, BRTSH MED. ASS'N, FUTURE
MODELS FOR THE NHS: A DISCUSSION PAPER).
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fects. 46 As U.S. health insurers begin pursuing similar financing
methodologies with physician group practices, Britain's capitation
experience still can be instructive to anyone seeking to evaluate
the impact of capitation payments on U.S. physician behavior.47
Fundholding groups, and the DHAs purchasing health ser-
vices for patients of those GPs not choosing fundholder status,
became far more powerful once the reforms were instituted.4
Purchasers' decisions now have the potential to spell survival or
demise for hospitals, including for their formerly untouchable
hospital consultant staffs.49 Analogies obviously can be made to
the predicament of U.S. specialists and hospitals encountering the
power of managed care insurers. Hospitals and specialist provid-
ers now are forced to negotiate with hard-bargaining insurers of-
fering subscribers preferred-provider plans, and must attempt to
woo those primary care physicians who control referrals as well.
British GP-fundholders in particular stood to gain personally
from their new strength as purchasers, because although they
have always served as gatekeepers to NHS specialist care, 0
never before have they had the opportunity to derive indirect
profit as individual doctors from making their referrals more
cost-effective.
B. Professional Advantages of GP-fundholder Status
To begin, merely having more economic leverage to secure
an improved service for patients carries obvious professional sat-
isfactions for GPs.5s Fundholder control over purchasing deci-
46. The King's Fund Institute in London currently is putting together a study to "in-
vestigate the efficiency" of total fundholding. Total Fundolding is Put to the Test, HEmTH
SERv. J., June 29, 1995, at 6; Rod Smith, et al., Room at the Top: How Can All Patients
Eventually Join the Top Tier of the NHS?, HEALTH SERv. J., Nov. 24, 1994, at 28;
Fundholders to Take Over All Purchasing, 308 BMJ 360 (1994) Cf. Fundholding Practices:
The Provision of Secondary Care, 14 NHS Management Executive (Health Service Guidelines
HSG) (1993).
47. See also Alan Maynard, Can Competition Enhance Efficiency in Health Care?:
Lessons from the Reform of the U.K. National Health Service, 39 Soc. ScL & MED. 1433
(1994) (concluding that "competition... needs to be used with caution and recognised as a
means and not an end in itself.").
48. Developing NHS Purchasing and GP Fundholding, NHS Management Executive 79
(1994).
49. Consultants historically have received lifetime appointments to NHS hospitals. Al-
though trust hospitals are theoretically free to employ new consultants on a different contrac-
tual basis, change has been slow.
50. BRITISH MED. AWN'H. THE HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL ETHICS 17-18 (1984).
51. One enthusiastic fundholder described the psychic satisfactions as follows: "I have
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sions entails the opportunity for GPs to "do it better" than the
more bureaucratic DHAs may be able to accomplish. Moreover,
fundholders can tailor their purchases to the special health needs
of the individual patients on their lists. In addition, fundholder
purchasing muscle helps to redress the historic imbalance of
power between primary care physicians and British hospital con-
sultants, which often has been exacerbated by Parliament's
closed-end and relatively tight-fisted funding of the NHS. Now
consultants and their hospitals are more directly dependent on
GPs for referrals, and therefore income, and in their own self-
interest must pay more attention to GP wishes and concerns.
Cash-limited local hospital budgets often had left GPs at a disad-
vantage in their attempts to secure hospital-based services for
certain patients. They also have helped give rise to the wide-
spread perception that Britain "rations" medical care.52 British
GPs usually have incorporated whatever local resource shortfalls
that may exist into their treatment recommendations, and Brit-
ain's more physician-centered (and less patient-rights-oriented)
law of informed consent tends to reflect (and deflect criticism
from) any local resource limitations.5 3
Britain does limit health care, of course, as do all countries,
including the United States. The United States just does it more
covertly than other nations do. They simply exclude many of the
increasing number of their uninsured citizens from the delivery
system altogether for non-emergencies.5 4 The NHS, by way of
contrast, has delivered excellent primary health care services
over the years, and has offered more or less reasonable secon-
dary and tertiary care access to everyone for decades. Britain
does ration non-urgent services for everyone more or less forth-
rightly, by way of its waiting lists. 55 However, the time patients
been a GP for 23 years but I have never been so excited and turned on as I am now... This
is megalomania isn't it? Fundholder, then total practice budget. Next year we want the de-
fence budget." Soundbites, HEALTH SERV. J., June 30, 1994, at 10 (quoting David Colin
Thom6, Runcorn GP fundholder).
52. See generally HENRY J. AARON & WaLtAM B. ScnwART, THE PAINFUL PaRscurI.
11oN: RATIONING HosprrAL CARE (1984) (emphasizing the trade-offs made in the British health
care system with a global budget).
53. Frances H. Miller, Denial of Health Care and Informed Consent in English and
American Law, 18 AM. J. L & MED. 37 (1992).
54. Oregon is the only state that explicitly rations medical services and only for its ex-
panded Medicaid population. See generally Howard M. Leichter, Political Accountability in
Health Care Rationing: In Search of a New Jerusalem, 140 U. PA. L Ray. 1939 (1992).
55. Not coincidentally, long waiting lists create demand for private care, which NHS
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must spend on those lists reportedly has shrunk significantly in
the five years since the government implemented internal
markets.
C. Potential Financial Advantages of Fundholder Status
In addition to the professional satisfactions accruing to
fundholder status, a GP's own financial position can be enhanced
considerably through astute purchasing choices for patients. One
of the first evaluations of the reforms even entitled its chapter on
fundholding, "GP Fundholding: Wild Card or Winning Hand?"5 6
The government, in order to persuade GPs to become purchasers
and advance the government's internal market agenda, initially
set generous fundholding budgets and promised to bail out
fundholders should they overspend. Therefore, in reality, GPs
took little downside financial risk when they assumed the more
entrepreneurial stance involved in purchasing.57 The chapter title
thus was directed more toward the government's gamble in offer-
ing fundholder status to GPs than to any financial windfall or
hazard a GP might have encountered in accepting it.
The British government does not permit any financial sur-
plus accruing from more efficient prescribing patterns, better pre-
ventive care, or more cost-effective referrals to inure directly to
GPs as individuals, but these savings can be plowed right back
into the GP's own fundholding practice to improve its amenities
and augment its services.58 By luring patients with services per-
ceived as superior to those available from other GP surgeries,59
such as shorter waiting lists, fundholders hope to attract addi-
tional patients. As a result, they can garner an increased number
of basic capitation payments for their own services to put in their
own pockets. Moreover, to the extent the practice itself is en-
riched from surpluses generated by savvy purchasing, its good-
will-which can be recouped monetarily when the GP leaves
practice-will be increased correspondingly. All in all, these fi-
nancial incentives for GPs to engage in fundholding are signifi-
consultants then can deliver wearing their private practice hats. The economic incentive for
consultant foot-dragging with regard to appointments for NHS patients is plain.
56. Howard Glennerster et al., GP Fundholding: Wild Card or Winning Hand?, in
EVALUATING THE NHS REFORMs 74 (Ray Robinson & Julian Le Grand eds. 1994).
57. See infra part V.E.l.
58. GLiERsTsmER Er AL., IMPLEMENTING GP FuNDHOLDING, supra note 31, at 13.
59. GP offices are referred to as surgeries.
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cant, notwithstanding the prohibition on direct financial gain to
doctors from effectuating savings through shrewd purchasing
decisions.
D. Efficiency Gains from Fundholding
Once fundholding took hold in 1991, GP-fundholders
showed considerable ingenuity in devising ways to improve the
efficiency and "user-friendliness" of their patients' care.60 They
struck deals with hospitals for faster service and better amenities
for their patients, and often got a more favorable price in the
bargain by threatening to refer their charges (with their all-
important financial reimbursements) elsewhere. However,
fundholders have been even more hesitant than U.S. insurers
about getting into the business of specifying standards of clinical
quality, let alone expected outcomes from treatment. They appar-
ently have concluded that given the current state of British infor-
mation systems and their own technology, accompanied by pro-
fessional skepticism about establishing performance indicators
and doing outcome analysis, those issues are too difficult for
small purchasers, let alone larger ones, to grapple with.61 But
fundholders have been creative in obtaining direct patient access
to services that usually were hospital-based only, such as physio-
therapy. These now are often delivered through fundholders'
user-friendly outreach clinics, with a minimum of patient disloca-
tion and delay.62
NHS waiting lists for consultant appointments and non-ur-
gent hospital care have been legendary, but some fundholders
have hired NHS consultant physicians in their private practice
capacity to run clinic sessions on GP premises, rather than rou-
tinely referring patients to those same busy specialists in their
hospital consultant roles. 63 Thus, long waits for initial appoint-
60. The King's Fund, London, a British health policy think tank, has established a na-
tionwide data base to track fundholder purchasing innovations. Purchaser Notes, HEALTH
Smuv. J., July 14, 1994, at 8.
61. The District Health Authorities, who purchase larger blocks of services for the pa-
tients of GPs not engaged in fundholding, have done no better at getting into issues of
clinical quality.
62. Fundholders Are Not Putting Cash Before Care, HEALTH SEiv. J., Mar. 16, 1995, at
6 (asserting that "[r]esearchers have debunked the popular image of fundholders as business-
minded penny-pinchers who are reluctant to spend money on patient care.").
63. Jacqueline Bailey et al., Outreach Clinics: The Special Branch, HEALTH SEav. J.,
July 28, 1994, at 30 (reporting on 96 outreach clinics covering medical and surgical special-
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ments were neatly averted, and many fundholder patients joined
the queue for any inpatient treatment that might be necessary at
earlier dates than otherwise would have been the case. Moreover,
by negotiating aggressively with hospitals to place contracts for
inpatient services, some fundholders were able to extract guaran-
tees that their patients would receive faster hospital-based treat-
ment than the larger and more cumbersome DHAs were able to
secure. Although the Department of Health officially discourages
such "fast-track" hospital service for fundholder patients, and
the British Medical Association has publicly condemned it as
creating a two-tiered NHS, fast-tracking nonetheless continues to
exist in some cases. 64 Fundholders also become creative in
achieving savings through their prescribing patterns, through
such methods as switching to generic drug formularies. 65
E. Socially Undesirable Side-Effects of Fundholding Incentives
1. Adverse Selection
"Cream skimming" of the healthiest subscribers is a well-
recognized competitive strategy among U.S. managed care insur-
ers, whose marketing schemes often are designed to select
against older and more chronically ill patients.66 Regardless of
whether incorporated in a for-profit form, U.S. health insurers
usually will seek to increase or at least retain market share in or-
der to survive. Economic theory teaches that the healthier the
risk pool insured, the more surplus will accrue to an insurer at
any given premium rate. Such striving for profit-maximization
always drives competitive insurance markets, whether it inures to
shareholders or enables the insurer to reduce premiums in order
to capture more subscribers. The same economic analysis, at
least in theory, applies to capitated providers.
ties). Some charge that consultants deliberately manipulate NHS waiting lists in order to gen-
erate demand for their services in the private sector. YATES, supra note 34.
64. David Brindle, Minister Rejects Consultants' Two-7ier NHS Treatment Claim,
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 1993, at 5.
65. Jon S. Dowell et al., Changing to Generic Formulary: How One Fundholding
Practice Reduced Prescribing Costs in the United Kingdom's National Health Service, 310
BMJ 505 (1995).
66. Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267
JAMA 2503 (1992). See also Harold S. Luft & Robert H. Miller, Patient Selection in a Com-
petitive Health Care System, HEALTH AF., Summer 1988, at 97.
Winter 1996]
HEALTH MATRIX
Some feared that once the NHS competitive reforms were
introduced GP fundholders would engage in adverse selection,
seeking to insulate their practice budgets from patients predicted
to be actuarially costly, because fundholders would seek greater
financial surpluses with which to upgrade their practices.6 7 Thus
far, those fears have gone largely unrealized for a number of rea-
sons.68 Among them are a strongly articulated and more service-
oriented British professional ethos, particularly among NHS phy-
sicians, than is generally found in the United States. This pro-
motes the kind of patient loyalty one would not expect to find in
the more impersonal insurer-subscriber relationship.69 In addition,
although fundholders now compete more or less overtly with
other GPs for patients, their initial fundholding budgets were set
on the basis of their own historic practice costs.70 Thus, the extra
financial burden of caring for their more expensive patients was
built into their spending power from the beginning. This created
perverse incentives, however, for it blunted the economic stimu-
lus to efficiency and perpetuated then-existing resource inequali-
ties. Any existing inefficiencies in the fundholder's practice ef-
fectively were subsidized.
Since 1993, however, fundholder budget allocations have
been partially tied to a weighted capitation formula, and eventu-
ally historic costs could be phased out altogether as a factor in
setting fundholder budgets.71 The temptation to engage in adverse
selection nonetheless will remain attenuated for British physi-
cians in comparison with the financial incentives facing capitated
U.S. doctors. Fundholders still are prohibited from directly pock-
eting whatever savings could be generated by eliminating costly
patients from their rolls, while their American counterparts cur-
rently are not. Moreover, the British government has provided
stop-loss coverage above £5000 to fundholders at no charge to
encourage more GPs to become involved in purchasing. Thus
far, the government generally has financially bailed out the few
fundholders who have overspent their budgets.
67. Richard Scheffler, Adverse Selection: The Achilles Heel of the NHS Reforms, 1
LANCET 950 (1989).
68. Matsaganis & Glennerster, supra note 42.
69. See generally JOSEPH M. JACOB, DoCroRs AND RuLEs (1988).
70. GLENNERSTER, ET AL. IMPLEMENTING FUNDHOLDING, supra note 31, at 116-34.
71. Id. at 133-49. Weighted capitation, however, has been criticized as slighting inner-
city needs. See, e.g., Steve Mayner, Funding Fails to Meet Needs of Inner Cities, HEALTH
SERV. J., June 23, 1994, at 7.
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2. Self-Referral
Although fundholders personally cannot keep surpluses gen-
erated by efficient purchasing, GPs can benefit financially from
astute purchasing decisions in ways other than attracting more
patients. When the reforms were first introduced in 1991, inno-
vative fundholders immediately devised strategies to generate
secondary income through their purchasing in ways that are ex-
cruciatingly familiar to observers of the U.S. health sector. For
example, some fundholders set up partnerships or private corpo-
rations with themselves and/or family members as owners. These
companies then provided ancillary services to fundholding and
other patients, if requested. As purchasers, fundholders could
sow the seeds of demand for their own products, from which
they could profit as investor-owners, and use their newly ex-
panded NHS practice budgets to satisfy the demand created. In
essence, they were able to buy from themselves using public
funds, with no middleman to ask awkward questions about
whether they really were getting value for money. Some
fundholders reportedly harvested "a windfall" in the process.72
All of this is reminiscent of the kind of physician self-dealing
that has occurred in the United States in all too many guises,
from ordering unnecessary testing in doctor-owned imaging cen-
ters73 to physician kickbacks for hospital referrals and cardiac
pacemaker installations. 74
The British government moved very quickly to curb this
type of conflicted practice among fundholders. By April of 1993,
within two years of the time the reforms went into effect, the
Department of Health had implemented a regulation that prohib-
its fundholders from contracting with companies providing health
services if those fundholders are in a position to receive income,
directly or indirectly, from those services. This parallels enact-
ment in the United States of the recent Stark I and Stark II legis-
lation, also designed to curtail physician conflicts of interest.75
72. Alan Pike, Government May Curb Spread of GPs' Companies, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 10, 1992, at 8.
73. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY. AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CoNFLICTS OF
ImiRasr 57 (1993).
74. Id. at 57-59.
75. Ethics in Patient Referrals Act (Stark I), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994) (effective Jan.
1, 1992) (prohibiting certain physician referrals for Medicare patients); Comprehensive Physi-
cian Ownership and Referral Act (Stark I1), 42 U.S.C. § 1359nn (1994) (effective Jan. 1,
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Significantly (particularly in light of its professed interest in dis-
covering the full range of innovations fundholders could devise
with competition as a spur to creativity), the Department chose
to regulate perceived abuses directly rather than to change the in-
centive structure which had elicited the censured professional
conduct in the first place. Fundholders still can plow back all
savings from purchasing into the practice itself, increasing other
services and amenities to attract more patients, and consequently,
more capitation payments to keep for themselves. However, they
do not yet have to remit fundholding savings back to the govern-
ment for redeployment to areas with lesser resources. GP
fundholders simply cannot profit directly from any surpluses gen-
erated by savvy purchasing.
3. Miscellaneous Gaming Problems of Fundholding
Several other alleged abuses of fundholder status have been
reported, but none seems either extensive or wide-spread at this
stage. For example, because fundholder budgets were originally
set on the basis of the GPs' historic practice patterns, inequities
were built-in from the beginning.76 There is some evidence that
GPs increased their referrals in the data collection period just
prior to embarking on fundholding to jack up their fundholding
budgets.77 The opportunity to engage in such manipulation is a
one-time phenomenon, however, and the gradual shift toward
weighted capitation has ameliorated the problem. In another ex-
ample of profit-maximizing gaming, fundholders in Wales alleg-
edly made "vastly more emergency referrals to hospital than
non-fundholders," indicating that these GPs may have engaged
in cost-shifting,78 a practice well-honed by U.S. hospitals and ex-
emplified in its most extreme form by patient-dumping. 79
1995) (prohibiting physician self-referrals for designated services). See also RODWIN, supra
note 73, at 126-28.
76. See Patricia Day & Rudolf Klein, Variations in Budgets of Fundholding Practices,
303 BMJ 168 (1991) (discussing spending patterns in fundholding practices); Jennifer Dixon
et al., Distribution of NHS Funds Between Fundholding and Non-Fundholding Practices:
United Kingdom's National Health Service, 309 BMJ 30 (1994) (suggesting that the methods
of allocation result in inequitable funding practices).
77. Dixon, supra note 39, at 773.
78. Dolly Chadda, Fundholders Account for Most Emergency Referrals, HEALTH SERv.
J., Mar. 30, 1995, at 5.
79. Maria 0. Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the
Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 B.Y.U. L REv. 971 (explaining that "dumping"
occurs when a hospital illegally transfers an emergency patient to another hospital, or refuses
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Fundholder budgets cover patients' expenses for non-urgent hos-
pital care only. However, subsequent data has indicated that other
factors probably explain those increased emergency referrals) °
VI. CONCLUSION
What autonomy lessons can be drawn from the U.S. and
British experiences with capitation? To begin with, capitating pri-
mary care physicians for services they alone provide should
work well for both physicians and payors in the United States, if
the British example is any guide. Both insurers and primary care
providers can make actuarial calculations on the basis of rela-
tively small numbers, and few diagnostic surprises can upset
their projections dramatically. Moreover, capitation should work
reasonably well for patients, so long as continuing relationships
are contemplated; this is usually the case when patients select
primary care doctors. Economic temptations to under-provide pri-
mary care are unlikely to subvert doctors' clinical judgment sig-
nificantly when they will presumably be interacting with their
patients on a long-term basis. Realistically calculated primary
care capitated payments do permit doctors to exercise the full
range of clinical judgment for their own services, and to cross-
subsidize the care requirements of their more clinically needy pa-
tients from the costs generated by their more healthy ones.
More troublesome difficulties can arise in both the United
States and the United Kingdom when providers are capitated for
more than their own expertise, although that is precisely the area
where the greater potential for efficiency exists. The fact that
few British fundholders have overspent their budgets for special-
ist and hospital care thus far indicates that the government prob-
ably set their original capitation payments too high to induce
GPs to make cost-effective choices that truly maximize effi-
ciency. The government no doubt financed fundholders gener-
ously to secure their cooperation for advancing its internal mar-
ket political agenda, just as it granted the medical profession
carte blanche clinical autonomy in 1948 when the NHS first was
instituted.8' The U.S. government engaged in a similar strategy in
treatment when the patient cannot pay).
80. Patrick Butler, High Emergency Admission Levels Here to Stay, HEALTH SEy. J.,
Sept. 14, 1995, at 3.
81. RuDoLF I. N, TE NEw PoLxncs OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SExvWcE 166 (3d ed.
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1983 when it switched to prospective payment for Medicare hos-
pital services, and fixed the first DRG payment amounts. When
budget pressures mount, however, governments inevitably tighten
the financial screws on providers in lieu of incurring voter wrath
by significantly increasing taxes. Provider resistance to such fi-
nancial squeezes is equally inevitable. Attempting to reduce a fi-
nancial advantage already enjoyed by a powerful physician inter-
est group is guaranteed to generate stiff political opposition,
regardless of whether patients advocate the overall finance
strategy.
The Conservative government banks on such fundholder
commitment to the purchasing concept, and on British GPs' re-
luctance to give up their newly recovered economic power, to
keep primary care doctors wedded to purchasing, and thus sus-
tain the NHS's competition initiatives. Labour has pledged to end
fundholding once in office, but it may find that pledge quite dif-
ficult to keep politically because the British Medical Association
is every bit as powerful in the United Kingdom as the American
Medical Association is in the United States. In any event,
fundholders probably will remain deeply attached to maintaining
a fair degree of control over where their patients go for hospital
and specialist care now that they have begun to enjoy that
power, whether it be through their own purchasing or through a
much larger influence on DHA contracting for patients care than
GPs have been accustomed to wielding in the past. Clinical au-
tonomy over referrals once regained will not be relinquished
lightly.
The referral autonomy issue in the United States is now per-
haps less problematic for primary care physicians than it is for
their patients who are beginning to understand that their choices
for specialists have narrowed considerably under many managed
care plans.82 However much those physicians may resist restric-
tions on their freedom to send patients wherever they choose for
specialist care, primary care doctors at least have their own fi-
nancial incentives to keep referrals from going out-of-network.
The British experience has demonstrated that GPs can be quite
1995).
82. The autonomy issue is complicated further in the United States because our doc-
trine of informed consent is more patient-centered than that prevalent in the United Kingdom.
See generally Miller, supra note 53 (contending that limitations of local resources play a role
in informed consent and treatment recommendations).
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innovative in creating efficiencies when allowed to make their
own referral arrangements, and to benefit financially thereby.
However, they are not as yet at personal financial risk if they
overspend their capitated practice budgets. The lessons to be
taken from their experience must, therefore, be tempered by the
understanding that the whole tenor of capitation in this country is
to force more hard-edged economic choice than is the case in the
United Kingdom. Stop-loss insurance coverage could perform
some of the same protective functions for doctors in this country
as government bail-out does in the United Kingdom, but presum-
ably, the expense of such coverage will be borne more immedi-
ately by U.S. physicians in the form of either direct costs or dis-
counted capitation fees.
The biggest potential for incursions on clinical autonomy
posed by the trend toward provider capitation stems from the
size of the capitated payment. A miscalculation of that sum can
spell disaster for physician and patient alike, and in the longer
run, for the insurer as well. Economic autonomy thus becomes
the pivotal issue when evaluating capitation proposals, and few
providers acting on their own or in small groups possess the
skills necessary to analyze capitation initiatives realistically - be
they their own or those of third-party payors - against hypo-
thetical future patient needs. Stop-loss coverage again could
function to cushion any financial blows, but the same costs
would be borne by providers as were delineated in the discussion
of referral autonomy. Thus, an investment in expert consultant
advice is critical to any provider, insurer, or government decision
about whether to go forward with capitation.
Capitation is no fail-proof panacea for physician autonomy
and health care cost-containment dilemmas, but neither is it an
inevitably flawed approach to the daunting quality and cost-con-
tainment problems of health care delivery systems. In order for
the right balance to be achieved between the professional and fi-
nancial satisfaction of physicians and a society's interest in pa-
tient welfare accomplished with a reasonable balance of cost-
effectiveness, both doctors and patients must sense a commit-
ment to fairness and equity on the part of payors who utilize
capitated payment systems, be they governmental or private in-
surers. In other words, all must approach capitation as a win-win
rather than a zero-sum game proposition if it is to bear out its
potential promise. A perception of commitment to that objective
should help to offset a scramble for short-term gain on all sides.
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The key is to build in incentive structures that are at the
same time sufficiently accurate to return adequate compensation
to providers when they deliver good quality care at a reasonable
price, and sufficiently difficult for insurers, providers, and pa-
tients to manipulate detrimentally. Both the United States and the
United Kingdom have had experience observing all players as
they gamed our respective health care delivery systems for finan-
cial advantage. Unfortunately, no country seems to have enjoyed
unqualified success in implementing strategies in which the eco-
nomic and professional incentives accurately reinforce the health
care quality and cost objectives that the society values.
